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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
American Booksellers Association v. Schiffl, 868 F.2d 1199
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiff, American Booksellers Association ("American"), chal-
lenged a New Mexico statute which regulated the display for sale of
materials considered "harmful to minors." No prosecution under the
law had been initiated by the Attorney General, and the district court
dismissed for lack of standing, finding no case or controversy was
presented. American appealed, alleging it had standing.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
The court found that the "threat" of a determination by the Attorney
General of "harmfulness" was substantial enough to establish standing.
The Attorney General's failure to enforce the law against American
prior to the suit's commencement made no difference. American still
may entertain a reasonable fear that the statute will be enforced and
affect its rights in the future.
Copp v. Unified School District, 882 F.2d 1547
Per Curiam
Dissent: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Copp, brought suit against defendant, Unified School Dis-
trict ("school district"), claiming that his first amendment rights were
violated. Copp argued that his right to freedom of association and free-
dom of speech were infringed after he was given an adverse transfer
from his job. The jury found for Copp, and the school district subse-
quently motioned for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV").
The district court denied the motion, and the school district appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in denying the
school district's motion for a JNOV regarding the freedom of associa-
tion issue. The court reasoned that the type of association claimed by
Copp was not protected under the first amendment right of association.
The court, however, found that Copp's speech was protected. Conse-
quently, the court concluded that the jury could have found that Copp's
right to freedom of speech was violated. The court applied a three-
prong test: (1) the plaintiff must show as a matter of law that the speech
deserved constitutional protection; (2) the plaintiff must show that the
protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse
decision; and (3) the defendant must then show that it would have
reached the same decision even in the absence of the protected conduct.
The court could not determine whether the jury awarded damages on
the speech claim, the association claim, or both. Consequently, the court
remanded the case for determination of whether Copp's speech was a
substantial or motivating factor in the decision to transfer him and
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whether defendants would have transferred him even in the absence of
his protected conduct.
Devine v. New Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F.2d 339
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Devine, who is serving life in prison for first degree
murder, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in district court. Devine
claimed that the state unconstitutionally delayed his parole eligibility af-
ter he committed the crime. The district court denied his petition and
Devine appealed. He argued that ex post facto principles preclude retro-
active restrictions on parole eligibility, that the due process clause gov-
erns ex post facto principles, and that the district court's decision to
apply a statute which was contained in the compiler's notes was unfore-
seeable and thus violative of due process.
The Tenth Circuit held for Devine and remanded the case to district
court. The court held that a law which imposes additional punishment to
that already prescribed is violative of ex post facto principles. In addi-
tion, the court held that since the ex post facto clause bars legislatures
from passing laws which impose additional punishment, then it follows
that the due process clause bars courts from achieving the same result
by judicial construction. Also, the court held that the application of an
uncodified statute was unforeseeable and thus violated the due process
clause.
Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiffs, high-ranking police officers, were reprimanded by de-
fendants, police chief Munger and the City of Colorado Springs (the
"City"), for part-ownership and participation in a video rental business.
The police officers rented a small percentage of sexually explicit films.
After plaintiffs removed the adult films from their inventory, Munger
spoke to the press about the City's reprimands for violation of police
regulations. The police officers brought suit against both Munger and
the City contending that the reprimands were illegal. The district court
granted summary judgment for Munger and the City. The court found
that neither Munger nor the City violated the police officers' first
amendment, liberty, federal and state privacy, and federal and state due
process rights. Further, the district court held that the department regu-
lations were not impermissibly vague. Moreover, the district court held
that Munger did not violate plaintiff Flanagan's rights by failing to reap-
point him as deputy chief. The police officers subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that Munger violated the police officers' first
amendment rights, but was entitled to qualified immunity and, thus, was
not liable. The court held that the City was liable for violating the police
officers' first amendment rights. The case was subsequently remanded
for determination of damages. The district court affirmed the court's de-
cision on both the privacy and deprivation of liberty claims because
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Munger's statements to the press were truthful and not highly personal.
The pertinent regulations of the police code were not found facially
vague, but the vagueness claim was remanded for findings regarding the
code "as applied." The charges of retaliation by Munger were found to
contain genuine issues of material fact, and summary judgment on this
issue was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485
Author: Judge Wright, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Foremaster, brought suit alleging violations of the estab-
lishment clause by the City of St. George. The action challenged the
depiction of the Mormon temple in the city logo and the city's subsidy of
the temple's electric bills. The district court dismissed the portion of the
complaint regarding the subsidy for lack of standing, and denied
Foremaster's motion for attorney's fees. The district court subsequently
dismissed on the issue of the logo.
The Tenth Circuit held that Foremaster did have standing to sue,
based on (1) his having suffered actual injury,, (2) a causal link between
the subsidy and the injury, and (3) the likelihood that the court proceed-
ing would result in redress of the injury. In granting attorney's fees, the
court applied a catalyst test, finding that the lawsuit was a substantial
factor in the city's decision to terminate -the electric subsidy and that
Foremaster had prevailed on the merits. The court held that the subsidy
impermissibly supported the Mormon faith in violation of the establish-
ment clause.
The court held that Foremaster had standing to challenge the city
logo because he was directly and continuously confronted by it. Finding
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not an
observer would perceive the logo as a governmental endorsement of
religion, the court remanded for determination of the primary effect of
the logo.
Johnsen v. Independent School District, 891 F.2d 1485
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Johnsen, brought an action against defendant, Independ-
ent School District (the "school district"), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
for violation of her first amendment rights. Johnsen contended that her
contract as a school nurse was not renewed after she spoke out against
the school district's medication policy. The district court granted judg-
ment in favor of the school district, notwithstanding the jury's $10,000
award to Johnsen. Johnsen subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit found that the district court improperly submit-
ted to the jury the question of whetherJohnsen's speech was protected.
The court concluded, however, that it could independently determine
the question. The court implemented a test to decide whether an ad-
verse employment decision violated a public employee's first amend-
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ment right to free speech. Under the test, the speech must touch a
matter of public concern, and the employee's interests in making the
speech must outweigh the employer's interests in promoting the effi-
ciency of its public services. The court found that Johnsen's speech
failed the balancing test. Consequently, the court concluded that John-
sen's speech was not constitutionally protected. The court explained
that the school district's interests in promoting its public services out-
weighed Johnsen's interests, because of the manner, time, and place
which Johnsen used to express her viewpoint. The evidence revealed
thatJohnsen circumvented school district procedures, contacted outside
agencies, organized meetings, dominated and intimidated co-employ-
ees, generated discord and disruption, and made public false accusa-
tions about the medication policy.
United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, King, pleaded guilty to the felony of assault with a dan-
gerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm. The district court subse-
quently ordered King to pay a special assessment fee of $50. The court
reasoned that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013, any individual convicted of
a felony must pay a special assessment fee of $50. King contended the
special assessment was in violation of the origination clause of the fed-
eral Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The district court rejected
his contention, and King appealed.
The Tenth Circuit, on de novo review, held that 18 U.S.C. § 3013
does not violate the origination clause of the Constitution. The reach of
the origination clause was held by the United States Supreme Court to
encompass only bills with the main purpose of raising revenue, not bills
which raise revenue incidentally. The court determined that the main
purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 3013, is punitive. The judgment of the district
court was, therefore, affirmed.
Luethje v. Peavine School District, 872 F.2d 352
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Luethje, claimed infringement of her first amendment
rights when her employer, defendant Peavine School District ("School
District"), adopted a rule restricting employees from certain discussions
regarding school problems. Luethje dismissed the suit when the school
district removed the prohibitory language from the rule. The district
court denied Luethje recovery of attorney's fees as a "prevailing party"
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Reversing the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit ruled that
a plaintiff who obtains relief from a defendant qualifies as a prevailing
party if the lawsuit is causally linked to obtaining the relief and if defend-
ant's conduct in response to the lawsuit is required by law. The court
held that the district court's causation finding was clearly erroneous.
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Luethje's suit need not be the sole reason for the School District's ac-
tion; a significant catalyst or substantial factor is enough.
In de novo review, the court determined that the district court erred
in its finding that the change was not required by law. Whether the
school district's policy was unconstitutional depended on whether it sti-
fled speech of public concern, and whether the policy was nonetheless
permissible was based on a balancing of the interests of Luethje and the
School District. The court found Luethje's complaints a matter of pub-
lic concern. Luethje's speech did not impair the discipline or operation
of the school since the School District's interest in maintaining harmony
was insufficient to justify restrictions on speech of public concern. The
court held that the School District was required by law to change its rule.
Martinez v. Sullivan, 881 F.2d 921
Author: Judge Holloway
Dissent: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Martinez, petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas
corpus following his conviction for second degree murder. Martinez al-
leged violation of his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to confront
witnesses, to effective counsel, to ajury fairly selected from the commu-
nity, and to severance of the trial.
The Tenth Circuit held that admission of an out-of-court declar-
ant's testimony was proper because the prosecution had exercised due
diligence in securing the witness' attendance, and the witness was "un-
available", thus meeting the requirements of the confrontation clause. A
second out-of-court declarant's testimony was also held properly admit-
ted. The witness was unavailable and reliability was based on two estab-
lished hearsay exceptions: present sense impression and excited
utterance. The district court was also correct in admitting a co-conspira-
tor's statements. Affirming the conviction, the court agreed that Marti-
nez' attorney was not laboring under a conflict of interest which resulted
in ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, the court concluded without
discussion that neither the jury selection process nor the joint trial vio-
lated Martinez' constitutional rights.
In a strong dissent, Judge Seymour would have granted the habeas
corpus petition and ordered a new trial. Regarding availability of wit-
nesses, the judge would adopt a per se ruling requiring use of the Uni-
form Act as a condition precedent to finding a good faith effort to secure
the witness' attendance. He also concluded that finding the witness un-
available was not harmless error.
Meder v. City of Oklahoma City, 869 F.2d 553
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Meder, an Oklahoma City-police officer, attempted to "fix"
some traffic tickets for a third party. Meder subsequently received free
tires for his personal vehicle from the third party. Meder was informed
1990]
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at an oral interview that these were grounds for dismissal. He was given
written notice of a hearing before a disciplinary board, and he was dis-
charged following the hearing. Meder filed a suit claiming he was denied
due process. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendant, Oklahoma City. Meder appealed, asserting that the due
process he received was inadequate because (1) the disciplinary board
was not impartial, (2) he was not given adequate notice of the charges
against him, and (3) he was not allowed to confront or cross-examine
the witnesses against him.
The Tenth Circuit held that Meder was provided adequate due pro-
cess. The court stated that Meder had no reason to question the board's
impartiality because he admitted in his deposition that no member of
the board should be excluded. The court also held that Meder was ade-
quately informed of the charges pending against him when he received
both oral and written notice. The court further held that Meder did not
prove how confrontation and cross-examination would have changed
the board's inference that acceptance of free tires was reasonably related
to "fixing" of the tickets.
Moss v. City of Colorado Springs, 871 F.2d 112
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiffs, four family members (the "Mosses"), brought an action
against defendant, City of Colorado Springs (the "City"), contending
that the City's police officers violated their fourth amendment rights.
The Mosses argued that the police officers used excessive force and en-
gaged in an unreasonable execution of a search warrant after bursting
into their home with no warning. The Mosses also brought pendant
state claims.
The Tenth Circuit held that the jury's verdicts in the district court
action were inconsistent. The court stated that since it was unable to
harmonize the verdicts, the case was remanded for a new trial. The court
explained that the jury found against the City, but in favor of the individ-
ual officers on the "unreasonable execution of a search" charge. Fur-
ther, the court was unclear as to which constitutional claim the jury
considered when deciding in favor of the police officers. The court re-
marked that the jury instructions were ambiguous, and the resulting ver-
dicts were indicative of the jury's confusion.
National Commodity and Barter Association v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, collectively known as National Commodity and Barter As-
sociation ("NCBA"), appealed dismissal by the district court of alleged
violations of the NCBA's first, fourth, and fifth amendment rights
through unwarranted investigation and collection of unlawful penalties




The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the NCBA's daim for
alleged violations of its fifth amendment rights. Claims against the de-
fendants in their official capacity as officers of the federal government
were barred by sovereign immunity. The NCBA's attempt to avoid this
bar by compliance with the Federal Tort Claims Act was ineffective,
since 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) expressly excepts tax assessment functions
from waiver. Fifth amendment violations do not mandate court-created
damage remedies because the NCBA had recourse to challenge the le-
gality of the penalty assessments under several provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code.
However, the court determined that the alleged first and fourth
amendment violations may warrant a court-created damages remedy.
Thus, the court remanded to the district court to permit the NCBA to
file an amended complaint which dearly outlines the basis for these
claims.
United States v. Neu, 879 F.2d 805
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Neu, sought review of the district court's denial of his
pretrial motion to suppress. Neu argued that a state trooper's stop and
detainment of him was pretextual and violative of the fourth amend-
ment. Consequently, Neu argued that the search of him, which yielded
weapons, was unconstitutional and thus, the weapons should not be ad-
mitted into evidence.
The Tenth Circuit stated that it must accept the district court's find-
ings of fact and uphold its ruling if there is reasonable evidence to sup-
port it. Since a traffic stop is a limited seizure under the fourth
amendment, the court applied the Tery test for constitutional "unrea-
sonableness": "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception
and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place." A traffic detention is
justified and is not a pretext for investigating unrelated criminal activi-
ties if probable cause for the seizure exists and if "under the same cir-
cumstances a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the
absence of the invalid purpose." The court held that the facts sup-
ported the district court's conclusion that the stop was constitutionally
reasonable. The state trooper had probable cause to believe Neu had
violated the traffic laws. Therefore, the court concluded that a reason-
able officer would have stopped Neu and requested his driver's license
under these circumstances.
Oklahoma Education Association v. Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement
Commission, 889 F.2d 929
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiffs appealed a district court order upholding the constitution-
ality of article 28, § 8 of the Oklahoma Constitution and its statutory
counterpart, title 37, § 511(D) of the Oklahoma Statutes. These provi-
1990] . 659
DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW
sions prohibit state employees from working in any phase of the alco-
holic beverage business. Plaintiffs claimed that the provisions violate the
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment
and their first amendment right to association.
In a de novo review, the Tenth Circuit found no fundamental right to
pursue government employment free from restrictions on additional
employment. Upon finding that the Oklahoma provisions are rationally
related to legitimate state purposes, the court held that the provision
violated neither the equal protection nor substantive due process rights
of the plaintiffs. The court further held that procedural due process was
not violated because the law affects a general class of persons who are
not entitled to individualized hearings and the legislative process ena-
bled the provisions to be fairly and accurately applied to the entire class.
Finally, the court did not find any violation of the right to association,
holding that the right applied only to relatively small personal affilia-
tions. The decision of the district court was affirmed.
Ortega v. City of Kansas City, 875 F.2d 1497
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, Ortega, was lured across state lines by Kansas City, Kansas,
police, telling him to pick up a package. Ortega was subsequently ar-
rested in the sting operation and released on bond. At trial, the district
court instructed the jury that Ortega could find the city and officials lia-
ble under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they lured him across state lines and de-
tained him in violation of extradition laws. The jury returned a verdict
for Ortega.
The Tenth Circuit held that arrest of a non-resident suspect
charged with a crime while in Kansas does not give rise to a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the constitutional right to extradition.
Extradition rights exist only when demand is made by one jurisdiction
for the surrender of a person in another jurisdiction. Moreover, suspects
have no pre-arrest extradition rights.
Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787
Author: Judge Baldock
Dissent: Judge McKay (dissenting in part)
Plaintiffs, members of the National Commodity and Barter Associa-
tion ("NCBA"), sought to recover damages from defendants, five agents
of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS"), for alleged infringement of the members' first and fourth
amendment rights. The NCBA advocates opposition to the federal in-
come tax laws. The five agents, Lovell, Batson, Fortune, Pixley and Hy-
att, investigated the NCBA with the assistance of inside informant
Adams. Adams carried a concealed microphone and transmitter into the
NCBA office and presented defendants with NCBA trash. The informa-
tion obtained from the trash was provided to a grand jury investigation
tax protesters. Batson subpoenaed financial records from a bank and
660 [Vol. 67:4
CONSTITUTIONAL
told the bank it was unnecessary to notify its customers of the
subpoenas.
The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment. Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the district court should have
held that: (1) Adams was an agent of the government and therefore her
actions could be imputed to the federal defendants; (2) Lovell, Pixley
and Hyatt were not entitled to qualified immunity; and (3) Fortune and
Batson were liable for their grand jury activities, including service of the
subpoenas.
The Tenth Circuit on de novo review held that: (1) Lovell, Pixley,
and Hyatt were not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judg-
ment because whether Adams was a government agent is a question of
fact for the jury; (2) if the jury determines that Adams was a government
agent, these defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity regard-
ing information relayed by Adams, if she obtained them within the scope
of her duties within the NCBA; (3) Batson was entitled to absolute im-
munity with regard to delivery of grand jury subpoenas and had quali-
fied immunity in informing the bank that they need not notify a
customer of the grand jury subpoena of bank records; and (4) Fortune
had absolute immunity with regard to delivery of grand jury subpoenas
and qualified immunity for technical consensual monitoring assistance.
The court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
Rankin v. Independent School District, 876 F.2d 838
Author: Judge Seymour
Dissent: Judge Barrett (dissenting in part)
Plaintiff Rankin, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
against defendant, Independent School District ("District"). Rankin al-
leged that the District failed to renew his tenured teaching contract in
retaliation for his statements regarding school disciplinary matters. Con-
sequently, Rankin argued that his first amendment rights were violated.
Rankin also argued that the nonrenewal violated his fourteenth amend-
ment due process rights. Rankin stated that the applicable Oklahoma
statute posed an impermissible burden by requiring Rankin to pay one-
half the cost of his post-termination hearing. The district court granted
summary judgment to dhe District.
The Tenth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to the statute, holding that
it was unconstitutional on its face. The court reasoned that the statute
imposed a substantial open-ended penalty on the exercise of a constitu-
tional right. The court also held, however, that due process does not
require a hearing prior to publication of reasons for dismissal. The court
held that Rankin presented enough evidence of first amendment viola-
tion to withstand a directed verdict for defendants.
1990]
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Seibert v. Oklahoma, 867 F.2d 591
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Seibert, who worked as a plumber for the defendant, Uni-
versity of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center ("University"), persistently
voiced concerns about the safety of the University's steam pipes and
boilers. Following oral and written reprimand, Seibert left his job for
over an hour without permission. Seibert was subsequently terminated
after refusing the opportunity to resign and failed to invoke the griev-
ance procedures within ten days of his termination, as allowed by the
University's policy manual.
The Tenth Circuit held that the University's pre-termination proce-
dures were constitutionally adequate and Seibert's termination did not
violate his first amendment rights. The court concluded that the Univer-
sity's procedures were actually post-termination and not pre-termina-
tion as the district court had held. However, the court stated that Seibert
had received the requisite pre-termination notice and the opportunity to
be heard. The continued verbal and written warnings, including a pro-
bation period, provided Seibert with ample opportunity to explain his
position. Thus, the court concluded that Seibert was not denied due
process. In addition, the court ruled that the University's interest in pro-
moting the efficiency of its public service outweighed Seibert's interest
in repeating his disruptive safety complaints after the complaints had
been investigated and settled. Thus, summary judgment was proper on
Seibert's first amendment claim.
Sommermeyer v. Supreme Court of the Stateof Wyoming, 871 F.2d 111
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Sommermeyer, appealed a court order which upheld rules
of the Wyoming Supreme Court. These rules required that an attorney
be a Wyoming resident to be eligible for admission to the bar on motion
instead of by taking a bar examination. Sommermeyer argued that the
residency requirement violated the privileges and immunities clause of
article IV, § 2 of the United States Constitution.
The Tenth Circuit held Wyoming Supreme Court Rule 5(c) to be
unconstitutional. The case was reversed and remanded with instructions
that Wyoming admit Sommermeyer to the bar of the state.
Veronie v. Garcia, 878 F.2d 347
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, First Southern Insurance Company ("First Southern"), as
intervenor, moved for summary judgment against defendant, Garcia, for
reimbursement of all worker's compensation benefits that First South-
ern had previously paid to Veronie because Garcia settled Veronie's
claim without First Southern's written approval. A Louisiana statute, La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:1102(c) (1983), provides that a third-party defend-
ant who fails to obtain such written approval must reimburse the em-
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ployer's insurer the total amount of benefits paid to the employee. The
district court denied the motion for summary judgment holding that the
Louisiana statute was unconstitutional. First Southern appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that Garcia's due process rights were not
violated since he had the opportunity to contest the statutory elements.
Accordingly, the statute does not violate the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The court further held that the statute does not
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. While
recognizing that section 23:1102(c) imposes a harsh penalty on third-
party tortfeasors who settle without employer or insurer approval, the
court concluded that the purposes behind the statutory right of reim-
bursement are legitimate ends of government and section 23:1102(c) is
rationally related to those ends. The court reversed and remanded for
consideration of the merits of First Southern's claim against Garcia.
United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Wolf, appealed the district court's ruling that 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251 is constitutional as applied to his conviction for sexual exploita-
tion of a child. Specifically, Wolf contended that the photograph at issue
was not within the contemplation of the statute because the sleeping
child was not exuding sexual suggestiveness and, therefore, the photo-
graph was not a "lascivious exhibition" under the statute.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's application of the
factors to determine the definition of "lascivious exhibition" as set forth
in United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 830 (S.D. Cal. 1986). The court
further stressed that it was the photographer's conduct and the depic-
tion of the child that was defined as lascivious, and that lasciviousness is
not a characteristic of the child photographed. The court held that 18
U.S.C. § 2251(a) as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256 was constitutional as
applied to Wolf's indictment.
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